The eurozone weathered another turbulent year in 2026, with the German fiscal expansion and resilient consumers offsetting the latest energy shock, and intense external competitive pressures. Growth to slow in 2027 on tighter fiscal and monetary policy and falling employment, but eurozone resilience should live to fight another year. The ECB’s new president could face some challenging judgement calls next year, not least over France. We expect a pivot from rate hikes to cuts as inflationary pressure eases and growth slows.

Solid foundations, the unique position in the semi-conductor supply chain and government spending have helped the Dutch economy withstand another energy shock. Growth is expected to moderate in 2027–28 as higher interest rates and inflation weigh on demand, despite continued support from exports. Inflation will remain persistent, while supply bottlenecks limit the economy’s growth potential.

The current economic recovery will continue in 2027, primarily due to fiscal impulses in the pipeline. Looking ahead, growth prospects are in line with the potential growth rate of around 0.3 percent. Inflation will remain an ongoing concern in 2027, but its impact will diminish as the year progresses.

Investment will keep driving growth in 2027, consumers keep up as falling inflation lifts real incomes. The energy shocks will fade without second round effects, the AI build-out keeps core inflation elevated. After one last hike in December, the Fed holds through most of 2027 before easing late in the year

GDP growth in 2026 supported by spillovers from global AI boom, but imbalances have worsened. Ongoing targeted, piecemeal support expected to safeguard GDP growth in 2027. The Six Networks scheme should contribute to a turnaround in investment. Despite hiccups, we do not expect trade relations with US/EU to spiral out of control next year. We expect annual real GDP growth to remain around 4.5% in 2027 and 2028.

Europe’s energy transition has entered a grid-delivery phase, with networks now a key constraint on renewable growth and electrification. Utility pressures vary: DSOs face load-driven connection backlogs, TSOs need to reinforce networks for offshore wind, and solar-heavy systems require more storage and flexibility. A grid-stress index is constructed to compare transmission, distribution, market and adequacy pressures across a sample of nine European countries. Germany records the highest grid-stress score, driven by congestion costs, reliability pressures, negative-price hours and substation overload. Faster permitting, anticipatory investment, early equipment procurement and grid-specific skills are essential to turn spending plans into operational capacity. Europe’s competitiveness depends on timely commissioning and lower total system costs - not simply on the amount of grid investment announced.

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is increasingly viewed as a necessary complement to energy efficiency and renewable energy in achieving net zero-emissions. The EU has acknowledged this role by establishing a certification framework for carbon removals, carbon farming and carbon storage in products. Global CCS deployment is projected to increase from 60 MtCO2/year today to 2.6 GtCO2/year in 2060. Today, around 85% of installed CCS capacity is linked to natural gas processing, but the sector is expected to shift towards other hard-to-abate industries by mid-century. Europe is expected to emerge as one of the world’s leading CCS markets, driven by rising carbon prices, industrial carbonization needs and growing transport and storage infrastructure.

The decline in greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands virtually stalled in 2024 and 2025. The new Jetten government aims to put emissions back on a downward trajectory, but its policy measures are unlikely to have a material impact before 2030, making a substantial overshoot of the 2030 target very likely. The EU’s 2040 target is also likely to be missed by a wide margin, as the pace of emissions reductions is expected to slow after 2030. Recent policy proposals, including the revision of the EU ETS and the Dutch plans for agriculture, nature and nitrogen emissions, are also likely to affect the emissions trajectory through 2040, with the balance of risks tilted towards higher emissions. The probability of meeting the binding EU targets for final energy consumption and renewable energy in 2030 is also very low.

Data centers are an indispensable pillar of the digital economy, but their rapid growth also raises questions. And this growth continues, including in the EU. This analysis shows which European countries are best positioned to attract new data centers. To that end, we examine both current and future data center capacity. We address the challenges, both in terms of power grids and investments and costs. This analysis shows how the AI boom, high costs, fragmented EU regulations, and increasingly scarce space are making the choice of location for data centers increasingly complex. We provide insight into the factors that determine data center developers’ site selection, and which EU member states are relatively well-positioned based on these criteria.

The summer of 2026 has so far been exceptionally warm and dry, with wildfires spreading across large parts of Europe. Recent indicators of land temperatures, drought conditions and wildfire activity are significantly exceeding longer-term trends. Moreover, economic losses associated with heatwaves, droughts and wildfires have risen steadily over time. In this note, we estimate the economic losses incurred across Europe during the summer of 2026, and we also consider what these developments may imply for the Netherlands. Finally, we examine the implications of these extreme weather events for energy markets.

Demand for clean technologies (also known as ‘clean tech’) from the European Union (EU) is set to rise sharply in the coming years. This is due to not only the EU’s ambition to meet its climate targets, but also to its drive to achieve greater energy security. It is highly likely that the acceleration in demand for clean tech will lead to a further increase in trade flows in clean technologies between the EU and its current trading partners. This analysis focuses on trade flows in clean technologies between the EU and countries outside the EU. We do not only highlight the balance of imports and exports of clean technologies in the EU-27 in relation to countries outside the EU-27, but also show which countries are the EU-27’s most important trading partners. The analysis also examines the impact of recent geopolitical conflicts on trade flows: that impact the region’s energy security. Finally, we assess the feasibility of the EU’s clean tech targets for clean technologies for 2030.

Are Dutch households already feeling the impact of higher energy prices? In this publication, we use anonymised and aggregated transaction data from more than a million households to track how higher energy prices are affecting household finances. Interestingly, despite five months of elevated energy market prices, the median household energy payment has barely increased. This is because many existing contracts are still in effect and new electricity tariffs are not significantly higher. Although higher oil prices are quickly passed on at the pump, the increase in household fuel spending has so far remained limited as motorists adjust their behaviour.

Extreme heat not only affects health and quality of life, but also leads to noticeable shifts in household spending behavior. The recent heatwave was accompanied by a temporary decline in Dutch household consumption. Online spending and cash withdrawals declined during the heatwave, while card spending initially increased and only fell during the most extreme heat conditions. Card spending held up relatively better in highly urbanised areas than in less urbanised regions. In particular, spending at restaurants and cafés increased in these areas, while fuel expenditures declined sharply elsewhere.

This year, approximately 1.5 million Dutch retirees are noticing the effects of the pension transition in their wallets. Based on anonymized transaction data, we analyze the spending impulse resulting from the “conversion bonus” (invaarbonus), the additional pension indexation due to the transition to the new pension system. Retirees spend on average only 22% of an extra euro of pension income. This percentage declines at higher ages. Retirees with lower incomes or limited financial buffers tend to spend a larger share of the additional income. Despite the relatively small percentage effects, the size of the conversion bonus, combined with a large number of elderly people, still provides a modest boost to the Dutch economy.

How is the war in Iran impacting Dutch households? In this publication, we analyse how quickly higher energy prices impact household finances, using anonymised transaction data from more than 1 million households. Higher gas prices feed through with a delay, meaning the average household energy bill payment has not yet increased. With regards to fuel spending, we see that rising oil prices filter through much quicker; this effect is already visible in March. We expect energy payments to continue increasing in the coming months, as was also the case in 2022. At that time, it took around a quarter for energy bill payments to increase noticeably. We will therefore monitor household energy payments closely in the coming months, particularly for households that are vulnerable to higher energy costs.

Due to the war in Iran, fuel prices have shot up, while gasoline prices in Belgium are up to 55 cents per liter lower. As a result, about 15% of gasoline consumption in the border region has shifted to Belgium, a change largely caused by a relatively small share of households. This effect is consistent for households living up to 30 kilometers from the border, meaning that not only gas stations near the border but also those further away may experience revenue losses. Nevertheless, the overall nationwide loss of excise tax revenue for the government remains limited.

Analysis of 320,000 households shows a decline in the housing expense ratio for the average household in recent years. The housing expenses ratio is the percentage of income spent on housing costs. Homeowners typically have a lower housing expenses ratio; private‑sector and social‑sector renters are at comparable levels. Younger buyers and private‑sector renters have similar incomes and housing costs. The housing expenses ratio for younger buyers has risen due to mortgage interest deductions and limited buying opportunities for lower incomes. Housing allowance is essential for many recipients, preventing households from having to spend more than half their income on housing costs.

Aggie van Huisseling is a senior economist Netherlands at Group Economics of ABN AMRO

Arjen van Dijkhuizen is Senior Economist Emerging Markets at Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank.

Finn Blokker is a data scientist within the Transaction Data Research team at ABN AMRO Group Economics.

Marta Teixeira is analyst Climate Economics at Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank

Casper Burgering is Senior Economist Energy (renewables) & Critical Materials at Group Economics of ABN AMRO.

Larissa Fritz is a Senior Fixed Income Strategist, with focus on Rates at the Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank.